The long-festering sectarian war between Iran and Saudi Arabia being played out through proxies in Iraq, Syria and Yemen just became overt. The execution by Saudi Arabia of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr — a radical Shia cleric in eastern Saudi Arabia — along with 46 other Al Qaeda (Sunni) cadres, quickly escalated with attack on its embassy in Tehran, harsh rhetoric and a diplomatic break between the two principals. The diplomatic rift has forced both countries into openly hostile and confrontational positions.
Far from an easy or quick resolution it is likely to fan insecurity in the region and put paid to the US coalition’s hesitant effort to combat ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) in Syria and Iraq. The Iran-Saudi break is a real test with potential for religious, political and economic impact on the region and
on India.
As expected, countries in the region have lined up along sectarian lines behind Saudi Arabia and Iran with Sudan, Djibouti and Jordan breaking relations with Iran, while the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar have recalled their ambassadors and decided to curtail their political relations. Israel, which considers Iran its major adversary, has viewed askance at the growing rapprochement between the US and Iran after the nuclear agreement and their making common cause against ISIS. The unusual coming together of the US’s two staunch pillars in West Asia to filibuster US policy towards Iran will only strengthen.
Nimr’s death quickly escalated into a diplomatic rift as it reflected the tense relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran since 2011 when the mis-named ‘Arab Spring’ was captured by entrenched sectarian interests. The drivers of the sectarian conflict are as old as Islam itself and are embedded with cultural interpretations and political analyses, apart from religious injunctions. The unending and brutal conflict being waged by ISIS in Iraq and Syria has been its most horrific manifestation and reflects the deep odds, which divide the two regional heavyweights in the region.
After the beginning of negotiations on the Iran-US nuclear deal, the relations have been further fraught. The uninterrupted negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany) which led to the agreement on closing Iran’s nuclear weaponisation programme created a sense of growing US-Iran proximity. It was further exacerbated by the common cause made by them to confront ISIS and other Al Qaeda clones in Iraq and Syria.
In consequence, Saudi Arabia has been smarting under two pressures: first, the belief that the US has given Iran a pass on its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launching without imposing any penalties on the operation of the nuclear agreement at the end of January 2016. It will remove sanctions on sale of Iranian oil netting it over $50 billion (some estimate it at $150 billion), but also de-freeze its assets sequestered in the US and European banks.
Second, with the US close to becoming No. 1 producer of oil and gas, Saudi Arabia foresees the lessening of its dependence on Saudi oil and hence of political and military support.
Despite new oil supply from Iran and the US, Saudi Arabia has refused to curtail its production plummeting crude prices to $32 per barrel, the lowest ever. This even though Saudi Arabia’s foreign exchange reserves have fallen below $648 billion. It is reported that during the past year 1.5 billion barrels per day more were put out on the market. The likelihood of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) being able to impose production quotas to firm up crude prices seems highly unlikely at this time.
With strong pressure from the United Nations and the US, Saudi Arabia and Iran have said that armed conflict between them is unlikely and it will not adversely affect the Vienna Process to initiate ceasefire and political negotiation of the Syrian conflict. Nevertheless, security in West Asia and the Gulf itself will have to be managed primarily by the US supported by British and French military power to ensure that direct war does not break out.
Indeed, there is an equal perception that these negative developments are the result of the US’s retrenchment from the region under President Barack Obama and possibly it may have overlearned the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. The fact remains that in the current situation only a strong initiative by the US to rein in the various powers may have the possibility of calming the waters.
India will be affected both positively and negatively by the current situation in the Middle East. The continuing low oil and gas prices have been a boon in reducing domestic inflation and transport costs. Nevertheless, India needs to exploit this window of opportunity by creating specific opportunities for pulling in foreign direct investment (FDI) from Western investors. At the same time, continuing insecurity can adversely impact the 5-million strong Indian diaspora in the region, of whom one million are in Saudi Arabia. The possibility of some of them returning for fear of personal safety — like it happened from Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon and Libya — needs to be factored it. Ongoing consultations and intelligence exchange with Gulf regimes to better understand current trends could defuse panic and assist working out of viable evacuation plans. In parallel, the direct impact on remittances will need to be assessed and made up.
Finally, unchecked rampant sectarian tension and insecurity could spread beyond the Gulf to South Asia, which has over 600 million Muslims of both persuasions. That it has been saved internal sectarian strife is a tribute to the Indian Muslim community. Nevertheless, it is necessary to reach out and build processes which will strengthen their cohesion and integration with the mainstream.
A wider resolution of ongoing parallel conflicts within Islam and political Islam will only be possible if the major Islamic powers look beyond current tensions to provoke a different and inclusive view of the religion.
(This story was published in BW | Businessworld Issue Dated 25-01-2016)
Guest Author
The author is a former Indian diplomat, Professor of Practice of Diplomacy and Public Affairs at Indiana University, Bloomington
