Chinese Checkers

By bringing issues hitherto evaded publicly to the forefront of the bilateral agenda he has created pressure for an early resolution, which is an advantage. But the disadvantage could be that if no progress is made, the policy of delinking political differences from economic engagement might become more difficult to sustain.

 

As against the joint statement in Beijing which says that outstanding differences, including on the boundary question, should not be allowed to come in the way of continued development of bilateral relations, Modi stressed in his joint press conference with premier Le Keqiang that China needed to “reconsider its approach on some of the issues that hold us back from realising the full potential of our partnership” and “take a strategic and long-term view of our relations”. He reiterated the importance of clarifying the Line of Actual Control and achieving tangible progress on issues relating to visa policy and trans-border rivers.

 

In his address at the Tsinghua University, Modi was more feisty in pointing out that if the two countries “have to realise the extraordinary potential of our relationship, we must also address the issues that lead to hesitation and doubts, even distrust, in our relationship”. He called for “deeper strategic communication to build mutual trust and confidence” so as to “ensure that our relationships with other countries do not become a source of concern to each other”. Unusually at his level, he frontally sought China’s support for India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council and membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. He has now outlined his political expectations from China in the years ahead. If progress in meeting them is not achieved in a reasonable time-frame, his economic agenda with China could become more vulnerable. 

 

The joint statement repeats the cliched language on the boundary question, with emphasis still on improved border management. The much touted One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative finds no mention in the joint statement, despite the importance president Xi attaches to it. Indeed, Modi noted pointedly in his address at Tsinghua University that “there are projects we will pursue individually”, which cold-shoulders China’s proposal to link the Mausam and Spice Route projects to OBOR. Why Modi mentioned progress in the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar) Economic Corridor in his Tsinghua speech, in addition to its mention in the joint statement, is baffling as the danger of allowing our northeast to drift into China’s economic orbit is self-evident. Significantly, the joint statement this time contains no reference to maritime cooperation and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

 

We have again thanked China’s foreign ministry and the government of “the Tibetan Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China” for facilitating the Kailash Manasarover Yatra, despite  China’s continued stridency on Arunachal Pradesh. Perhaps this was a quid pro quo for the stronger formulation on terrorism in the joint statement and the separate joint statement on climate change that fully meets India’s needs before the December climate change summit in Paris where attempts to isolate India would be made. The reference in the joint statement to the “commonalities” in the approach of the two countries to global arms control and nonproliferation whitewashes China’s historical and current proliferation activities in Pakistan for the dubious recompense of China “noting” our aspirations to join the NSG. That Modi himself announced at the last minute the grant of e-visas to the Chinese, without obtaining satisfaction on the stapled visa issue, raises questions about policy making. Of the 24 agreements signed during the visit, only the ones relating to the opening of our respective consulates in Chengdu and Chennai and space cooperation are significant.

 

The driving force behind Modi’s wooing of China being economics, the outcome there was of most interest. However, the joint statement largely repeats what was said in September 2014 during Xi’s visit about the scope of cooperation and addressing India’s concerns about market access, except that a high-level working group would now look into the latter. Railways sector cooperation and the establishment of two industrial parks have featured prominently during this visit also. The $20 billion figure of Chinese investments in India in the next five years or more — for optical effect — was not mentioned this time. The 26 “agreements” signed at Shanghai were mostly MOUs with the private sector with no binding value in renewable energy, power, steel and so on. Even financing of private Indian companies by Chinese banks has been put on the positive ledger. That these MOUs, if and when implemented, are potentially worth $22 billion, is an excusable PR exercise that all countries resort to in order to embellish the economic “success” of visits by their leaders abroad. Will China’s unfettered entry into key areas such as renewable energy give them eventually a grip over such sectors at the cost of local industry is a point to consider.

All in all, the China challenge for India remains.